

Regarding the Petition for the Provisional Injunction Against Allotment by Makino Milling Machine Co., Ltd. of Share Options Without Contribution

April 17, 2025

Nidec Corporation

Petition Overview



- Nidec Corporation (the "Company") commenced the tender offer (the "TOB") for shares of Makino Milling Machine Co., Ltd. ("Makino") on April 4, 2025 (as per the schedule published on December 27, 2024).
- ☐ In response, on April 10, 2025, Makino resolved to implement an allocation of share options without contribution (the "Allotment Without Contribution") as a countermeasure against the TOB.
- The Company has filed a petition for a provisional injunction (the "Petition") with the court to restrain the Allotment Without Contribution.

		$\overline{}$		_	Contract to the contract of th	
. ın	eп	O	в		verview	

Tender Offeror	Nidec Corporation			
Target Company	Makino Milling Machine Co., Ltd. (Securities Code: 6135. Tokyo Stock Exchange Prime Market)			
Tender Offer Period	From April 4, 2025, to May 21, 2025 (however, if the number of tendered shares reaches the minimum threshold during this period, it will be extended to ensure an additional 10 business days can be secured starting from the business day following the disclosure of such fact).			
Tender Offer Price	JPY 11,000 per share	e		
Premium	Base date: 12/26	Base day's closing price: JPY 7,750 1-month average: JPY 7,112 3-month average: JPY 6,552 6-month average: JPY 6,313		
Minimum Number of Shares to be Purchased	More than 50.00%			

Background to the Petition



- The Company announced on December 27, 2024, that it would commence the TOB on April 4, 2025. The Company had sincerely explained and responded to Makino's repeated lengthy and short-deadline requests and guestions.
- However, on March 19, 2025, Makino, at its board meeting, adopted a policy (the "Response Policy") seeking unilaterally to postpone the start of the TOB to May 9, 2025.
- When the Company commenced the TOB as scheduled on April 4, 2025, Makino resolved at its board meeting to implement the Allotment Without Contribution. Accordingly, the Company has filed the Petition to seek its restraint.

Date (MM/DD)	The Company	Makino	
12/27	·Letter of Intent published by the Company.		
1/15~ 3/17	•Explanation of the Company's views regarding the request on the right. •Submission of responses to the letters of inquiries on the right.	 Two sets of requests were submitted by the Special Committee. Three letters of inquiries were submitted by Makino, each with a response deadline of two to three business days. 	
3/10		·A request was made to postpone the commencement of the TOB until at least May 9.	
3/14	•Responded that the Company has been sincerely considering the request made on March 10.		
3/18		·A request was made to respond to the above request by March 19, 4:45 PM.	
3/19	•Explained the status of consideration regarding the request of March 18.	·The adoption of the Response Policy was decided and announced	
4/3	•Decision and announcement of the commencement of the TOB.		
4/4	•The commencement of the TOB.		
4/10		 An opposing opinion regarding the TOB was expressed. A resolution of the Board of Directors was passed to implement the Allotment Without Contribution. 	
4/16	•The petition for an injunction against the Allotment Without Contribution (the Petition).		

Significance of the Petition



- ☐ In August 2023, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry ("METI") formulated the "Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers" ("Acquisition Guidelines") with the aim of making "desirable acquisitions" more likely to occur for the economic society (Guideline 1.1, 1.2).
- The Company made a "sincere acquisition proposal" as a transaction beneficial to the corporate value of Makino and the common interests of shareholders, in accordance with the Acquisition Guidelines as a "desirable acquisition" as stated therein.
- Nevertheless, Makino failed to conduct the "sincere consideration" required by the Acquisition Guidelines and continued to exhibit a dismissive and adversarial attitude from the initial receipt of our proposal, ultimately initiating countermeasures to block the TOB (i.e., the Allotment Without Contribution).
- ☐ If the Allotment Without Contribution is permitted, any acquisition proposal not aligned with management's intentions will be easily obstructed, thwarting the promotion of "desirable acquisitions" envisaged by the Acquisition Guidelines, and consequently, it will be impossible to break the stagnation of the international competitiveness of Japanese companies.

Acquisition Guidelines (Formulated by METI)

- ☐ The significance of the Guidelines is to promote "desirable acquisitions" (Guideline 1.1, 1.2).
- The fundamental principle is to conduct "sincere consideration" of a "sincere acquisition proposal" (Guideline 3.1.2).
- Regarding the policy on responding to acquisitions, it is clearly stated that it must not result in hindering the sincere consideration of an acquisition proposal (Guideline 5.1).

Makino's Response

- Failed to conduct "sincere consideration" and continued with a dismissive and adversarial attitude from the initial receipt of our proposal.
- Ultimately initiated countermeasures (i.e., the Allotment Without Contribution) to block the TOB.

Significance of the Petition

- ☐ If the Allotment Without Contribution is permitted, any acquisition proposal not aligned with management's intentions will be easily obstructed.
- If this happens, it will be impossible to promote "desirable acquisitions," as envisaged by the Acquisition Guidelines, and consequently, it will be impossible to break the stagnation of the international competitiveness of Japanese companies.

Reason for the Petition① – The Allotment Without Contribution Constitutes an "Anti-Takeover Measure"



- ☐ Makino argued that the Response Policy is "not an Anti-Takeover Measure."
- However, the Allocation Without Contribution produces a devastating effect where the Company, even if the TOB is successful, is forced to forgo acquiring control and bears significant economic damage, aptly described as a "Poison pill."
- ☐ In other words, the Allotment Without Contribution is undeniably an "Anti-Takeover Measure," and considering judicial precedents, it is illegal unless there are (i) "necessity" and "appropriateness" for introducing and triggering the Anti-Takeover Measure, and (ii) "special circumstances" to justify it.

Overview of the Allotment Without Contribution

Allotment of Class B Share Options (exercisable only if the holding ratio falls below 20%) The Company Makino Shareholders other than Allotment of Class A Share the Company Options (convertible to 1 share as per acquisition provisions)

Damage Incurred by the Company as a Result of the Allotment Without Contribution

- □ Conversion of Class A Share Options into 1 share per option will dilute the Company's holding ratio by a maximum of two-thirds (e.g., if 50% is acquired through the TOB, it will be diluted to 33%).
- □ To compensate for the damage caused by dilution through the exercise of Class B Share Options, the Company must sell shares until its holding ratio falls below 20%.
- □ After the TOB, the Company's stock price is expected to return to the level before the announcement of the TOB. Hence, the Company faces a potential loss of "several tens of billions of yen" calculated by "(JPY 11,000 the stock price at the time of sale) × the number of shares acquired".
 - ** The average stock price of Makino during the one-month period prior to the announcement of the TOB was JPY 7,112. The highest historical stock price prior to the announcement of the TOB was JPY 9,600.

Reason for the Petition 2 – The TOB is not coercive in nature, and therefore, there is no necessity for any Anti-Takeover Measure



- Coercion means that shareholders feel pressured to tender their shares, even if they believe the offer price to be lower than the objective value, because they expect to be disadvantaged if the takeover is completed while they refrain from tendering their shares.
- The TOB contemplates disclosure if the number of tendered shares reaches the minimum threshold (over 50%) during the initial tender offer period and extension of the tender offer period (additional tendering period) to ensure 10 business days from the day following such disclosure.
- □ Therefore, shareholders can decide whether to tender during the initial tender offer period without coercion because they are given an opportunity to tender during the initial tender offer period.
- Whether or not the shares tendered during the initial tender offer period exceed 50% can serve as means to confirm the shareholders' intention regarding the appropriateness of the TOB, without needing to deliberate on the need for the Anti-Takeover Measure at a shareholders' meeting, rendering the Allotment Without Contribution illegal.

Time at which the number of tendered shares exceeds 50%

Initial Tender Offer Period

Additional Tender Offer Period

Tender/ Not Tender Shareholders other


than the Company

- Even if shareholders do not tender during the initial tender offer period, they have another opportunity to tender during the additional tender offer period (no coercion during the initial period).
- □ The TOB is non-coercive, and shareholders are able to express their intent—by tendering their shares during the initial period if they support the TOB, or by choosing not to tender during the initial period if they oppose it.
- ☐ If over 50% tender during the initial tender offer period, it means over 50% support the TOB.
- ☐ In the absence of tenders exceeding 50% during the initial tender offer period, the TOB simply fails.

Reason for the Petition 3 – It is equivalent to the "Anti-Takeover Measure" being activated solely by the board of directors



- To avoid damages from the implementation of the Allotment Without Contribution, the Company is compelled to extend the tender offer period to the June annual shareholders' meeting to ensure the possibility of withdrawing from the TOB.
- ☐ This results in a tender offer period end date nearly identical to what Makino demanded ("starting the TOB on or after May 9").
- Makino effectively implemented the Anti-Takeover Measure that, solely by resolution of the board of directors (i.e., without confirming the intention of the shareholders), forces an extension of the tender offer period of the TOB until the annual shareholders' meeting in June (Makino could have held an extraordinary shareholders' meeting before introducing the Anti-Takeover Measure or during the Company's tender offer period).
- Such Allotment Without Contribution does not align with recent court precedents requiring shareholder judgment in activating Anti-Takeover Measures and is illegal.



Reason for the Petition 4 - Sufficient period has been secured for the TOB



- ☐ Makino asserts the necessity of securing "time required for the materialization of third-party proposals, etc."
- However, the TOB has ensured a period of "60 business days" from the date of its announcement (December 27, 2024) to its commencement and, including the tender offer period, a period of "at least a total of 91 business days, and a further considerable probability of 101 business days *" has been secured.
- ☐ In prior actual transactions, competing offers have generally been made within approximately 30 business days, and at the latest within 49 business days, from the initial announcement of the TOB.
- ☐ Thus, in the TOB, sufficient time required for materializing third-party proposals has already been secured, and Makino's assertion is unfounded.

**Generally, tenders for a tender offer tend to concentrate on or close to the last day of the tender offer period, so there is a considerable probability that the number of tendered shares will reach the minimum threshold at the end of the initial tender offer period (31 business days), extending the period by 10 business days thereafter, making the tender offer period 41 business days.

Target Company	Initial Tender Offeror	Competing Offeror	Period Until Competing Offer
UNIZO HOLDINGS COMPANY, LIMITED	H.I.S. CO., LTD.	SAPPORO GK	26 business days
SHIMACHU CO.,LTD	DCM HOLDINGS CO., LTD.	NITORI HOLDINGS CO., LTD.	20 business days
TOYO CONSTRUCTION CO.,LTD.	INFRONEER HOLDINGS INC.	Yamauchi-No.10 Family Office	24 business days
BENEFIT ONE INC.	M3, INC.	DAI-ICHI LIFE HOLDINGS, INC.	17 business days
ROLAND DG CORPORATION	XYZ KK	BROTHER INDUSTRIES, LTD.	22 business days
HORII FOOD SERVICE CO.,LTD.	AZABUDAI I LLP	CITY CREATION HOLDINGS INC.	18 business days
JAPAN ASIA GROUP LIMITED	GREEN HOLDINGS, L.P.	CITY INDEX ELEVENTH CO.,LTD	48 business days
CHILLED & FROZEN LOGISTICS HOLDINGS CO., LTD.	AZ-COM MARUWA HOLDINGS INC.	SG HOLDINGS CO., LTD.	49 business days
SHIBAURA ELECTRONICS CO.,LTD.	YAGEO Electronics Japan GK	MINEBEAMITSUMI INC.	43 business days

Reason for the Petition 5 - Makino has not conducted a "sincere consideration"



- The Special Committee of Makino, from its establishment, hastily concluded a strongly negative evaluation of the Company, abandoning a neutral stance and adopting a hostile position against the Company.
- Makino's Board of Directors, despite our repeated requests for meetings, only agreed to a brief meeting of about 1.5 hours and never requested an increase in the tender offer price. On the contrary, they demonstrated behavior intended to deter the Company from raising the tender offer price, disregarding the common interest of shareholders.
- Such responses from Makino and its Special Committee cannot be said to constitute the "sincere consideration" required by the Acquisition Guidelines, nor can they justify "special circumstances" warranting the Anti-Takeover Measure.



- Despite our repeated requests for meetings, they agreed to **only one meeting of approximately 1.5 hours** more than two months after the announcement of the TOB. Furthermore, the President of Makino did not attend the meeting. Nevertheless, they claim that "sufficient meeting was held."
- □ (In response to our announcement on February 25 that "there is currently no plan to increase the tender offer price",) Makino commented in a manner deterring any increase of tender offer price by the Company by stating, "in light of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, which prohibits the dissemination of misleading information, and considering Nidec's emphasis on transparency, we understand that… Nidec will not raise the offer price under any circumstances, even if a counter-proposal is actually made".

Special Committee Merely 4 business days from the establishment of the Special Committee, they hastily concluded a strongly negative evaluation, stating "akin to the so-called Saturday Night Special tactic," "truly regrettable" and "untrustworthy method," "your company's stance is questionable."

Reason for the Petition 6 – Makino's true intent lies in preventing the TOB



- Makino argues that the purpose of the Response Policy (i.e., to request the commencement of the TOB on or after May 9) is "solely to secure time necessary for the materialization of third-party proposals, etc."
- ☐ However, the reasons given by Makino for requesting the commencement of the TOB on or after May 9 have changed opportunistically to date.
- ☐ In addition, Makino does not intend to cancel the Allotment Without Contribution even if no third-party proposal is made by the completion of the TOB or even by the June annual shareholders' meeting.
- ☐ In light of the above, it is evident that Makino's claim of "securing time necessary for the materialization of third-party proposals, etc." is merely a pretext, with the true intention being to obstruct the TOB.

The reasons for setting the commencement of the TOB on or after May 9 have changed opportunistically

As of January 15 (Special Committee)

- Immediately after the fiscal year ending March 2025, it is a busy period
- Securing a period for shareholders to deliberate based on the announcement of financial results for the fiscal year ending March 2025

As of February 7 (Makino)

Securing time to organize and disclose to shareholders the presence or content of synergies and their reasons after consultation

As of March 10 (Makino)

 Securing time to receive a final letter of intent from a third party and conduct a sincere comparative review

The Allotment Without Contribution will not be cancelled even in the absence of any third-party proposal

- □ The Response Policy does not include, as a reason for cancellation, even "if no third-party proposal is made by the completion of the TOB."
- The Allotment Without Contribution is not intended to be canceled even "if no third-party proposal is made by the June annual shareholders' meeting."

"Securing time necessary for the materialization of third-party proposals, etc." is merely a pretext, with the true intention being to obstruct the TOB.

- Disclaimer Regarding Forward-Looking Statements -
- This presentation and the replies for the subsequent Q&A session are announcements prepared to announce the TOB publicly, not to solicit selling shares. When applying to sell shares, please make sure to see the TOB instructions on this TOB, and apply at your own discretion as a shareholder. This presentation and the replies for the subsequent Q&A session do not correspond to, or constitute any part of, the solicitation of purchasing, applying to, or selling securities. Therefore, this presentation and the replies for the subsequent Q&A session (or any part thereof), or facts regarding their distribution do not form the basis of any contract regarding the TOB, nor can one refer to them in executing a contract.
- This presentation and the replies for the subsequent Q&A session contain forward-looking outlooks, expectations, judgements, plans, or strategies. Descriptions and statements based on those forward-looking outlooks contain currency exchange fluctuation, fluctuation in product demand, development and production capabilities of various types of products, affiliated companies' performance, and other risks and uncertainties. The descriptions and statements based on all the forward-looking statements included in this presentation and the replies for the subsequent Q&A session are based on the information available to Nidec via reasonable means as of the time and date of this presentation, and unless otherwise stipulated by law, Nidec is not obliged to update its descriptions or statements based on such future forecasts. In addition, since, among other reasons, these descriptions and statements do not guarantee any future performance, and numbers of elements are interrelated in a complicated way, actual results may differ from such descriptions or statements, or from Nidec's current expectations. For these elements and risks, please see the contents of Nidec's related documents, information, etc. that the company has disclosed as necessary.

- Disclaimer Regarding Forward-looking Statements (Cont'd.) -
- The TOB described herein is implemented in compliance with the procedures and information disclosure standards stipulated in Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act; however, these procedures and information standards do not necessarily match those of the United States. In particular, Article 13 and Article 14 (and rules created under the same Article) of the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "US Securities Exchange Act of 1934," including amendments thereafter) do not apply to the TOB, which is not based on these procedures or standards. All financial information included in this presentation material is not necessarily equivalent to the US's financial information. In addition, the Tender Offeror (Nidec) and the Target Company (Makino Milling Machine Co., Ltd.) are both companies founded outside the US, with their executive officers being non-US residents. Therefore, it may become difficult to exercise or request any right based on a US securities-related law to these individuals. Further, one may not be able to commence legal procedures, at a court of law outside the US, against a legal entity of any of its executive officers, based on a violation to a US securities-related law. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a US court for any legal entity outside the US or any of its executives may not be approved. Unless stated otherwise, all the procedures regarding the TOB herein must take place entirely in Japanese. All or part of the documents regarding the TOB herein is made in English, but the documents in Japanese will prevail if any discrepancy should exist between such English and Japanese documents.
- In addition, legal restrictions may apply to the distribution of this presentation material in some countries or regions. In such a case, please keep in mind and comply with those restrictions.

